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Several years ago I attended a debate at the Oxford debating union . The 
debated proposition read: "This house thinks that the cloning of human 
beings is unethical." Arguing in favor of the proposition was Ian Wilmut, 
head of the Scottish research team that successfully cloned Dolly the 
sheep. Arguing against was the well-known Oxford Darwinian and 
militant atheist, Richard Dawkins. 
Wilmut's argument against human cloning was balanced and 
moderate: his research team had a less than 1 % success rate in transferring 
cloned sheep embryos into female sheep uteruses; given the much greater 
complexity of human development, there promises to be an even lower 
success rate with human cloning; nor have we any confidence that having 
successfully cloned and transferred a human embryo, there will not result 
monstrous developmental deformities. Since the only way to perfect the 
procedure is to work out the kinks through repeated experimentation, and 
since thi s means a massive wastage of human embryos and grave threat to 
the welfare of clones who survive, the experimentation should not be 
started in the first place. 
Dawkins scoffed at Wilmut's warnings. Sure, he said, the kinks need 
to be worked out, and until that time research ought to proceed with great 
cauti on; but rest assured, they will be worked out. He then turned to the 
audience and said : "Twenty years ago we experienced a non-rationally 
grounded emotional repugnance at the prospect of ' test-tube babies'; today 
IVF is a common and widely accepted form of assisted reproduction. Our 
present emotionaJ misgivings about human cloning are no less irrational. 
Mark my words, twenty years from now human cloning will be as 
232 Linacre Quarterly 
widespread and warmly embraced as IYF is today." The audience sat in 
silence as if saying by their blank expressions, " I may not like it, but what 
he says sounds true." The proposition nan'owly passed. 
There i pressure at the local , national and intemationallevel to give a 
green light to human cloning, at least for purposes of biomedical research. 
Liberal politicians (Democrats and Republicans) are joining forces with 
biotech companies, Hollywood figures like Michael J . Fox, Chri stopher 
Reeve and Carol Burnett, and the ever-biased American media to 
characteri ze opponents as narrow-minded religious conservatives, as anti-
scienti fie , and as ideologues motivated by petty "pro-life" pol itics 
indifferent to profound human suffering. Neveltheless, the question needs 
to be asked: "Ought we now or ever do thi s kind of research ?" In thi s essay, 
I argue " No." 
I. Cloning: Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer 
Presently the most common type of human cloning is called somatic 
cell nuclear transfer. It begins with a female gamete (i.e. , an oocyte or egg) 
harvested from a donor. In the nucleus of that oocyte is half the genetic 
material (DNA) necessary for human development. 
In sex ual reproduction the other half is contributed at fertilization by 
the male gamete or sperm cell which contains in its nucleus half the genetic 
complement necessary for human development. 
But cloning is asexual reproduction ; no sperm is necessary. The 
nucleus of the female oocyte is removed, leaving the oocyte "enucleated." 
The nucleus of a somatic cell is then extracted (somatic cells are any cells 
other than human gametes - oocytes or sperm cell s), and its nuclear 
contents transferred into the enucleated oocyte. Since the nucleus of every 
somatic cell contains a virtuall y complete genetic complement of the 
donor, the oocyte, having received the somatic cell 's nuclear contents (i.e., 
its DNA), now contains all the genetic material necessary for human 
development. It is important to understand that the (nuclear) genetic 
materi al contained in thi s oocyte is unrelated to the female who donated 
the oocyte. Rather its genetic identity is identical to that of the donor of the 
somatic cell (who may be male or female or even, theoretically, non-
human) . 
I f the somatic cell nucleartransfer is successful, the resulting entity is 
no longer an oocyte, but a human zygote, a human being in its earliest stage 
of development. With the stimulus of an electrical impulse or with special 
chemicals the human zygote will begin actively dividing and be launched 
into the dynamic process of human maturation and development. 
The purpose for the cloning would be subject to the intentions of the 
cloners. Reproductive cloning as it is popularly called, would entail 
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implanting the living human embryo in a female uterus and bringing the 
child to term. So-called therapeutic cloning would entail cultivating the 
embryo in vitro (in the laboratory), then exploiting it for whatever so-called 
therapeutic purposes the cloner wills. Presently, the main "therapeutic" 
interest is to harvest mature embryonic stem cells, a process that kills the 
embryo. Cloning in thi s way is attractive because the cloned embryo would 
have the identical nuclear genotype (genetic code) to the donor of the 
somatic cell, who may also be the clinical patient. The stem cells and 
tissues derived therefrom would have a high degree of biological 
compatibility and hence be far less prone to problems of tissue rejection. 
II. Ethical Evaluation 
Terminology: 
The common terminological distinction between "reproductive" and 
"therapeutic" cloning is artificial and misleading. Every instance of human 
cloning is reproductive insofar as the intention of the cloner is to produce a 
new human being at the origins of his or her development. Admittedly, the 
intentions of the cloner for using the clone are different - the difference 
between having a baby and performing valuable, but destructive 
experimentation - but the subject of both is a new human being. 
Secondly, the term "therapeutic" implies that the procedure is helpful to the 
subject of that procedure. But in therapeutic cloning, no benefit is intended 
to the subject; in fact, the procedure is lethal to its subject. 1 It is important 
therefore to adopt language that does not contain within itself biases in 
favor of an unscrutinized ethical conclusion. For clarity's sake I will adopt 
the terminology used by the President's Council on Bioethics in its 2002 
report on human cloning, which distinguishes between cloning to produce 
children and cloning for biomedical research. 
Cloning fo Produce Children: 
A matter of control: Many motives can underlie the desire for cloning 
to produce children - duplicating individuals exceptional for some talent 
or trait; reproducing an image of a dead (or living) loved one; producing 
individuals immune from genetic di seases; selecting someone for cosmetic 
reasons like sex or physical appearance; making people for use as a source 
of spare body parts. More sinister motives - which we have no reason to 
impute to present-day defenders of cloning, but which, given the sad 
history of human wickedness, ought not be excluded as real possibilities 
for our future. These include producing people for purposes of sexual or 
economic exploitation, advancing military objectives, or in the interests of 
various other forms of human slavery. 
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What do all these motives share? They share the will of one 
generation to exercise control over another. But doesn ' t any family 
planning involve control? Yes, more or less, but not nearly to this degree. In 
ordinary family planning a couple undertakes the important deci sion of 
determining how many children to have, when, where and under what 
conditions to have them. No doubt the family planning decisions of 
couples can be immoral , especially if they will to bring children in to the 
world without the will or manifest ability to nurture them. But their 
decision does not touch the real identity of their child. 
In cloning, the clone's very own biological identity is controlled. It is 
imposed upon her by another, not received as a gift from God as the 
incommensurably unique melding of the genetic qualities of the two 
parents. And it is imposed for reasons unrelated to the good of the clone. 
Her interests cannot logically be the subject matter of the choice for her 
identity since there is no her prior to the imposition of identity, only a 
range of other identities from which to choose. The identity is therefore 
chosen, not for her good, but at the di scretion of the choosers, we might say 
for their good, a startling exercise of willful domination of one person over 
another. 
To be clear: in cloning, human biological identity is imposed by the 
cloners. To be sure, the control is only over genetic identity, not over one's 
full humanity, which is a unity of a material body and immaterial soul. The 
clone's soul is created by God and infused in the tiny individual, 
presumably at the moment her development begins.2 But biological 
identity is essential to human identity. My biology is me, even though I am 
more than my biology. Among all that I can consider mine - my bank 
account, my house, even my family - little is more essential , more 
personal , more self-defining than my bodily identity. The natural process of 
human procreation assures that each human person has a unique and 
unrepeatable biological identity. 
In the case of identical twins (that is, monozygotic twins) , that genetic 
identity is received by two who share characteristics of biological 
subjectivity, but who still receive that identity as a gift. Because of the 
relative contemporaneity of their beginnings,3 the twins are still free to 
create their own hi stories, albeit more closely identified with one another 
than non-twinned siblings. 
Cloners, on the contrary, impose the identity of one who already is (or 
was), one who already has a history. Thi s is a violation of what it seems to 
me is a natural right of the human person, namel y, the right to subjective 
identity. Cloning is a form of radically unjust violence against the clone's 
personal subjectivity. It is also a violation of the fundamental principle of 
human equality since the clone in her origins stands in relation to the cloneI' 
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not as proceeding under (more or less) equal conditions but in the relation 
of maker to product. Christians understand this willful and unjust control 
over another's subjective identity to have even more profound implications. 
The biological identity we receive through the seemingly chance process 
we call fertilization, is an identity whose trajectory stretches beyond 
temporal horizons. The Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body 
illumines for us the reality that the body I possess now will be directly 
related to the bodily identity I will possess for all eternity. 
The abolition of sexual reproduction: Cloning renders human 
generation asexual. A male and female are no longer required for bringing 
forth of new life. Females are required as egg donors, and males not at all. 
The notion of maternity is muddled: is the egg donor mother, or the 
somatic cell donor, or the woman who carries the child to term? And the 
notion of biological paternity is virtually abolished altogether. Cloning 
perverts the basic relational structure of the human person. A clone does 
not have a biological mother and father, but rather a si ngle progenitor. She 
might be the twin sister of her mother, the daughter of her grandfather, or 
the twin of an aborted baby. The old folk song, "I' m My Own Grandpa" 
takes on a whole new meaning. In vitro has already confused the bonds of 
kinship, but cloning renders them almost meaningless . 
Moreover, cloning displaces the specifically conjugal (COining 
together) dimension of human procreation within the logic of human love 
and self-giving into an impersonal project of laboratory research within the 
logic of industrial production (Let's not fool ourselves, cloning will become an 
industry with enormous economic implications.) . Is there any natural 
human reality more intimate, sublime and consequential , indeed more 
human , than the flowering of conjugal love into the fresh blossom of new 
life? In cloning, the link between conjugal love and procreation is severed.~ 
This is not to say that the cloners would not be personally interested in, or 
committed to, or emotionally invested in the product of the procedure. But 
the intensity of sentiment surrounding the process should not obscure the 
reality of what it is: the process is not begetting, it is making. 
The advent of asexual human reproduction strikes at the heart of 
Chri sti an anthropology by rendering the complementarity of the sexes 
in·elevant. Chri stian revelation teaches that God made humanity "male and 
female"; neither male alone nor female alone. Man and woman represent 
in their integral individuality two different types, two unique 
complementary embodiments (embodied manifestations) of the spiritual 
being we call the human person, each having his respective significance for 
himself and for the other according to the divine plan. In other words, it 
was part of God's will that there be two sexes; God wants two sexes. The 
Genesis 1 creation narrative gives one foundation for thi s differentiation: 
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God 's command to "be fruitful and multiply, fill the em1h and subdue it" 
tells us that sexual differentiation and complementarity are related to 
procreation. At the very heart of the Christian conception of the origins of 
the human person is the belief that God created man and woman to be 
joined together in an embrace that is intrinsically meaningful for the 
bringing forth of new life. Hence, Christian faith supports what the natural 
law prescribes, namely, that marital cleaving (marital sexual intercourse) is 
the only fitting context for the bringing forth of new life. ' 
Cloning for Biomedical Research: 
The nature and identity (the "status" of the human embryo: Many, if 
not most, who defend human cloning defend it not for purposes of 
producing children but for biomedical research. Cloning research can be 
justified, they maintain , because of its utility in curing disease and 
relieving human suffering. It is unfortunate (they say) that human embryos 
will be destroyed in the process but this unf0l1unate consequence is 
justified by the promised results . 
The determining ethical question to be asked is what is the nature and 
identity of the cloned embryo? Is the embryo a human life and therefore a 
full human being? Or is it merely pre- or potential human life, something 
that will become but is not yet a member of the human family (something 
defenders of destructive embryo experimentation routinely assert)? If it is 
merely pre-human, then lethal experimentation upon it, for compelling 
reasons, might be justified since the subject would not be a human being. 
But if the human embryo is human life, then cloning for research purposes 
would simply be the deliberate creation and subsequent disposal of human 
life for the sale benefit of others. How do we resolve this question? We 
begin by looking at the empirical facts. 
Before the transfer of the somatic cell's nucleus into the enucleated 
egg the human ti ssues collected for manipulation are clearly not internally 
organized whole human individuals. The oocyte and somatic cell are 
donated body cells of other whole self-organizing human individuals, 
extensions we might say of those individuals. After the transfer and 
successful stimulation of embryonic development, we are no longer 
dealing with a mere part of another's body, but with a newly organized 
whole, albeit immature, living member of the species homo sapiens. 6 
Let us examine this assertion. The individual is whole and self-
organizing, insofm' as it contains within itself the epigenetic primordia (i.e. , 
the complete genetic code and living dynamism) for internally coordinated 
development into a fully mature member of the species. Yes, it needs 
nurture from outside itself, but so do newborns, the infirm and the elderly. 
Actually everyone, arguably, at every stage of development needs nurture 
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from outside himself for healthy human development. It is living (as 
opposed to dead, or not yet living), insofar as it has come into existence as 
an entity with an enduring reality - with a history - that will include 
organized self-moving natural development towards full maturity. And it is 
indubitably human, not canine, bovine or feline, and will in a brief time-
within eight or so weeks - actively develop a morphology that will 
identify it as such even to the untrained eye. 
What sense can be made of calling it merely pre-human life and 
hence of denying it full human rights? Some reply, because it is not till day 
fourteen - the onset of development of the primitive streak - that 
monozygotic twinning can no longer occur. Since before this point the 
human embryo can twin, that is, split in two (sometimes more) embryos, it 
follows (they say) that it is not yet a unitary human life; the living being 
that is identical with the later being with a developed personality has not 
yet emerged. But this logic is fallacious. Granted, it does prove that before 
day fourteen the developing human organism has the potential for a split 
that will give rise to two ( or more) developing human organisms. It also 
proves that before twinning we are not dealing with two whole organized 
human individuals. But it does not follow that before day fourteen we are 
not dealing with any whole human individual. 
And we have good reasons for concluding that we are dealing with a 
fully human life. Human development begins in the zygote stage and 
unfolds seamlessly from that stage through a series of natural internally 
self-directed development phases. There is no discreet identifiable moment 
nor even series of events after the new organism comes into existence that 
can be construed as the beginning of a new organism. If we say it emerges 
into humanity sometime after it comes into existence, what is it before that 
point? It is not part of another's body, as is an oocyte or somatic cell. It is 
not awaiting an origin as a living member of a species, since that takes 
place at the zygote stage. It is not awaiting some essential contribution to 
its development from outside itself, since from its genesis it contains 
within itself the epigenetic primordia for self-directed growth into 
adulthood. Both before and after day fourteen the manner and direction of 
its maturation is determined by the genetic material contained within it, not 
by extrinsic causes. What, therefore, would be the cause of its emergence 
into humanity? 
Moreover, embryological evidence shows that the embryonic cells 
prior to day fourteen do not function as an aggregate of unrelated 
noncommunicating cells, but rather as a single organism. They interact, 
communicate and are restrained from autonomous development. It is true 
that sometimes a totipotent cell splits, giving rise to a newly developing 
organism, and, yes, this event normally happens before day fourteen. But 
the fact that twinning might occur before day fourteen is insufficient reason 
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for concluding that before day fourteen the embryo is an unorganized 
aggregate of cell s awaiting some organizing event or principle to bring 
them together into a functioning human whole. In other words, the fact that 
you can produce two from something does not prove that something is not 
presently one, or that it is indetenninate. A flatworm or a plant or an 
amoeba is divided and the result is two flatworms , plants (as in cuttings) or 
amoebas, but this does nothing to show that prior to such division the 
flatworm , plant or amoeba was not a unitary organism. 
Since everyone begins his or her existence as an embryo, it is 
reasonable to conclude that when we are dealing with a human embryo, 
even at its earliest stages of existence, even with the potential for twinning, 
we are dealing with a tiny but fully human being, and that the terms zygote 
and embryo, like the terms fetus, baby, child and adult, are not terms 
designating substantial identity, but rather phases in the development 
(maturation) of a being whose substantial identity has already begun. 
Some still might be unconvinced. The empirical evidence, they might 
argue, does not settle the question of the ethical illegitimacy of lethal 
experimentation on the early human embryo. A thought experiment will 
help us consider the ethical question from another vantage point. If you 
were a military pilot during peacetime, ordered to test incendiary bombs on 
a designated target, and your radar gave evidence that there were 
unidentified living beings, lots and lots of living beings, stirring at ground 
zero ; if you were uncertain, but had good reason to believe that they might 
be innocent civilians, would you be ethically justified in dropping your 
incendiary bombs on ground zero based on the reasoning that the status of 
the objects on your radar screen was uncertain? 
The empirical evidence, if not proving conclusively that the early 
human embryo is human life worthy of full moral respect, provides good 
reasons for concluding as much. At the very least, the evidence leaves in 
our minds a serious doubt. The honest scientist or clinician therefore must 
inevitably confront the objection: "It might be a human being I'm planning 
to create and experiment on, therefore, I might be planning to do something 
ten'ibly wrong." 
In the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary, is not the 
scientist, clinician, public official or anyone, for that matter, morally 
required to treat the human embryo as a whole human being with human 
rights and refrain from actions that would be gravely wrong presuming this 
were the case? It is on the basis of this reasoning that the CDF teaches that 
"the human being must be respected - as a person - from the very first 
instant of hi s existence." (Donum Vitae , I, I ).7 And in its Charter of the 
Rights of the Family, the Holy See teaches: "Human life must be absolutely 
respected and protected from the moment of conception."8 
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Given the weighty human goods at stake, the burden of proof lies on 
the side of the cloners and experimenters to prove beyond any doubt that 
the subjects of their experimentation are not human beings. This is 
something they clearly have not done, nor does it seem they are interested 
in doing, which makes one doubt the sincerity of their commitment to this 
important moral question. 
The question of utility: But what about the great goods that could 
result from cloning for biomedical research? Doesn ' t the goal of 
significantly advancing scientific and clinical knowledge and the prospect 
of relieving telTible human pain and suffering justify experimentation that 
destroys human beings? In other words, don ' t good ends justify bad 
means? It is tempting to answer yes. And the temptation increases when 
the refraining from doing evil promises the continuation or increase of the 
prospect of suffering evil. 
The question is not new. It is the ancient question of the legitimacy of 
utilitarian morality, a question Socrates famously confronted when he 
asked the timeless question, is it better to do evil or suffer evil? Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle, and the entire Christian tradition from St. Paul (Rom. 
3:8), to St. Augustine, to Thomas Aquinas to John Paul II, answer with one 
unbroken voice: to do evil is to become evi1.9 
Moreover, virtually every great world religion and influential moral 
philosophy formulates a common demand of morality, a universal moral 
norm relevant to the problem of cloning, more ancient than the utilitarian 
premise. We find it in Christianity, Judai sm, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Taoism, Confucianism, Sikhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, Unitarianism 
and Native Spirituality. Christianity calls it the Golden Rule: we should act 
toward others as we would wish them to act toward us. It requires us to 
place ourselves, in our imagination, in the position of those with whom we 
do not ordinarily or naturally identify, like that of a tiny human embryo, 
and then ask ourselves, if I were in this position, how would I wish to be 
treated? Which of us would wish to be produced in a laboratory, 
experimented upon and then killed? 
If my reasoning is COlTect, and the human embryo is a whole living 
human being, then asexually producing it, experimenting upon it for 
reasons unrelated to its own welfare lo and subsequently destroying it 
involves the following grave injustices: 1) A violation of its right to 
subjective identity, 2) A violation of its right to be brought into the world in 
the context of a loving marital embrace, II 3) A violation of its right not to 
be harmfully exploited for another's gain and without its consent,12 and 4) 
A violation of its right not to be killed. 
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Conclusion 
When Louise Brown, the world's first test-tube baby, was born, the 
Patriarch of Venice, Albino Luciani , was one of the first to promise his 
prayers for the newborn. Just months later, Luciani was elected pope as 
John Paul I, a pontificate that lasted 33 days. There was some consternation 
at the archbi shop 's statement for fear it might appear to legitimize the 
process by which the baby had been brought into being. Whether or not 
this was the case, I do not know. But it was perfectly right that Luciani 
should offer hi s prayers for the baby 's well-being. Irrespective of the 
process, the baby was, and is, a human being worthy of esteem, protection 
and prayers. 13 
The same can be said for a human clone, whether it is marked for 
embryonic destruction or destined by its cloners for full-tenn delivery. A 
human clone will be a full human being, ontologically equal in its humanity to 
every other human being, made in God 's image and likeness, redeemed by 
the blood of Jesus, and destined for eternal and blissful communion with 
the Trinity in heaven, even though he or she will have been brought into 
being under morally reprehensible conditions. If cloning to produce 
children proceeds successfully, then those who defend human life should 
oppose every effort to abort cloned children in utero, exploit them after 
birth, or in any other way arbitrarily limit their human rights. Similarly, if 
cloning for biomedical research is sanctioned, and another generation of 
embryonic human life, like the generation begun with IYF begins, 14 then 
pro-lifers will expand the scope of their activist concern to include their 
welfare and protection. But the Rubicon has not yet been crossed; there is 
still a way back. The question as to whether cloners and their advocates 
will achieve their legislative or judicial designs has not yet been answered. 
Human cloning is an example of value-free science driven by 
utilitarian morality. The 1997 Vatican document, Reflections on Cloning, 
says it well: "Cloning ri sks being the tragic parody of God's 
omnipotence."15 Its defense and promotion proclaims, with Nietzsche, the 
"death of God." Its acceptance by the Western world will result in the death 
of mankind as we know it. 
We must answer a question at the heart of morality: is human freedom 
(including scientific freedom) for something or is it indifferent? Is it 
limited, ethically speaking, solely by the contingency of possibility, or is it 
morally circumscribed by the requirements of human good, human dignity 
and human well-being? Aren't there some things that we should not do, 
even though we can do them? 
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reads:;' 0 one, before coming into ex istence, can claim a subjecti ve ri ght to begin to 
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